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Eldred v. Ashcroft: International Influences and the
Outer Limits of the Copyright Clause
I. Introduction
It was "Mickey Mouse vs. The People" according to one
headline,' and another described Walt Disney's famous creation as
"The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain."2 While Mickey Mouse
was not a party to the suit, his fate is very much at the center of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft. At issue
is whether a host of copyrights, including Mickey's debut in
Steamboat Willie,4 George Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue,5 and F.
Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby,6 would remain under
copyright or pass into the public domain.7 There is no doubt the
Court's decision will draw more colorful criticisms from some
members of the public. Instead of being decried as a 'kangaroo
court,' the nation's highest court may instead become known as a
'Mickey Mouse outfit,' complicit in upholding some of
Congress's own "Mickey Mouse legislation., 8  Though terse
public criticism is hardly new to the Court, this decision may earn
these phrases a measure of sardonic appropriateness that even
1 Damien Cave, Mickey Mouse vs. The People - How an Antiquarian Bookseller
and a Nathaniel Hawthorne Fan Ended Up Before the Supreme Court, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/02/2 1/web-copyright/ (Feb. 21, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
2 Chris Sprigman, The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the Copyright
Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
commentary/20020305_sprigman.html (Mar. 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
3 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
4 STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney Studios 1928).
5 GEORGE GERSHWIN, RHAPSODY IN BLUE (Warner Brothers 1924).
6 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (Charles Scribner's Sons 1953)
(1925).
7 See generally Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 769.
8 Seth Shulman, Freeing Mickey Mouse, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/shulmanII02.asp (Nov. 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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hardy Justices would rather live without.
Eldred v. Ashcroft asked the Court to consider the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA),9 a statute passed by Congress in 1998 that generally
lengthened copyright protection by twenty years." The CTEA
allowed copyrights to grow from the life of an author plus fifty
years" to the author's lifetime plus seventy years.' 2 In the case of
works made for hire, those authored anonymously or under a
pseudonym, protection remains for 95 years from date of
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first. 3
The CTEA is the latest in a long history of congressional
copyright extensions, including acts passed in 1831, 1909, and
1976.14
The petitioners advanced two basic challenges to the law, one
under the Copyright Clause and another under the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 5 They argued the law did not
comply with the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement 16 on
two grounds. First, although the law declared a definite term of
years, history indicated that congressional renewal of copyrights
had in effect become incrementally perpetual.' 7  Second, they
contended that providing longer protection to works copyrighted
under previous statutes like the 1976 Act allowed works set to
9 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 101, 112 Stat.
2827-2828 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304
(2002)) [hereinafter CTEA]. As a veteran of the entertainment industry, Congressman
Sonny Bono was a vocal supporter of the Act, and the bill was given his name following
Bono's untimely death in a skiing accident. See generally Bernard Weintraub, Sonny
Bono, 62, Dies in SkiingAccident, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1998, at A16.
10 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 774.
11 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
12 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
13 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000).
14 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 775.
15 Id. This note will address only the First Amendment argument and holding in
Eldred to the extent that it is necessary for a basic understanding of the Court's decision.
The emphasis will remain on the case's copyright elements and will specifically address
the international justifications and influences surrounding the copyright issues.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 775.
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expire to be granted infinite copyright on a post hoc basis.' 8
Petitioners' First Amendment argument suggested the law
improperly restricted certain speech and could not survive
heightened scrutiny. 9 Writing for a seven member majority,
Justice Ginsburg rejected all these claims, holding Congress was
within its constitutional authority and had not exceeded the bounds
of the limited times requirement.2"
Eldred v. Ashcroft provides a glimpse into the Court's view on
the progressive internationalization of intellectual property laws
and the proper role of international norms for intellectual property
law. This international (and predominantly European) influence
comes against a backdrop of evolving twenty-first century
technology and ever-increasing globalism. In all respects, this
note focuses primarily on the international aspects of copyright
law and the Eldred decision.2' Part II summarizes the facts and
procedural history of Eldred. Part III surveys the background law,
including past and current copyright acts.22  Part IV analyzes the
18 See id. at 777.
19 Id. at 775.
20 Id. (Stevens, J. and Breyer, J., dissenting).
21 The Eldred decision is provocative in a number of ways and will undoubtedly
generate scholarship from a multitude of sources. First, the Court's apparent deference
to Congress in the current context is in strong contrast to conventional wisdom
suggesting the Rehnquist Court has been ready and willing to limit congressional and
executive powers. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause); see also Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (limiting executive power of line item veto); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting Fourteenth Amendment power); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Tenth Amendment limitations). Second, the
intellectual property community will likely have substantial follow-up commentary on
the case for its precedential and technical impact within that specialty. See Symposium,
Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1 (2002) (prospectively discussing the issues and impact of Eldred
prior to the current decision). This note necessarily confines itself to the international
justifications for the CTEA and seeks to answer whether the Court will tend to permit or
restrict the progressive internationalization of intellectual property law. See generally
Symposium, Symposium on Constructing International Intellectual Property Law: The
Role of National Courts, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 989 (2002) [hereinafter Chicago
Symposium] (providing a historical and advisory discussion on the emergence and
development of international norms by and through domestic bodies of law).
22 Part III gives only a brief overview of past Copyright Acts and relevant treaties.
A useful critique of the Court's opinion requires a substantive discussion of the
background law, which is analyzed in Part IV.
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holding and rationale of Eldred and considers more deeply the
impact of foreign treaties and the relevant legislative history upon
the case's holding. This analysis illustrates how the Supreme
Court has taken a highly deferential approach to the current
statutory regime. It suggests that Congress and the President have
almost unlimited discretion in creating international intellectual
property norms, provided they do not run afoul of the most glaring
bright lines. This note concludes that the majority contradicts
itself in light of groundbreaking federalism cases like Lopez and
Chadha.23  Finally, this article maintains that the Court's
Copyright Clause jurisprudence is retracing a history similar to
trends in the history of the Commerce Clause.
I. Statement of the Case
A. Facts and Parties
Eric Eldred is a small bookseller who utilizes the Internet and
materials from the public domain to help promote his business.24
He has maintained a website publishing popular works by literary
icons like Nathaniel Hawthorne and Robert Frost since 1995.25
Mr. Eldred published both derivative works and copies of texts
online that allowed international and around-the-clock access to
materials previously available only through brick and mortar
libraries.26 Unlike libraries, however, Eldred is unable to freely
circulate a book and take full advantage of the "first sale
doctrine" 27 in the same way a conventional library can. Instead,
23 See supra note 21; infra notes 43, 187-89 and accompanying text.
24 See generally Brief for Petitioners at *3, Eldred v. Ashcroft (No. 01-618), 2002
WL 1041928.
25 Cave, supra note 1, at * 1.
26 Brief for Petitioners at *5, Eldred v. Asheroft (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041928.
27 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2002)). The 'first sale doctrine' allows the owner
of a copy to freely sell, distribute, or dispose of the copy in her possession without
needing permission from the original author. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Recent amendments
to the Copyright Act have maintained an express exclusion of certain digital media from
the first sale doctrine:
unless authorized by the owners of copyright in the sound recording or the
owner of copyright in a computer program... , and in the case of a sound
recording in the musical works embodied therein, neither the owner.., nor any
person in possession of a particular copy ... may, for the purposes of direct or
indirect commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
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his materials are more extensively regulated under copyright laws,
and in order to build a collection comparable to that of a print
library, Eldred must secure the permission of each author's estate
before publishing the works online.28 Collectively, petitioners
claimed their efforts to cultivate and enhance materials available
in the public domain were harmed by the new copyright
regulation.29 Eldred, in particular, had to remove publications
previously posted on the Internet to avoid potential liability,
including old books with unknown copyright ownership.3" He was
joined in the suit by a host of other businesses and individuals who
"allege that they each use, copy, reprint, perform, enhance, restore
or sell works of art, film, or literature in the public domain."'" The
plaintiffs included commercial publishers and non-profit
organizations representing community orchestras, choirs,
historians, and preservationists.32 The plaintiffs brought suit
seeking declaratory and injunctive relieft 3 from the CTEA
provisions imposing substantial civil liability and related laws
creating criminal penalties for violations.34
B. Procedural History
After the CTEA's lengthened protection was passed, Eldred
and his fellow plaintiffs filed a federal suit against the government
possession of that phonorecord or computer ... by rental, lease, or lending, or
by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or lending.
17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). This exclusion largely reflects the practice of extensive file-
sharing of digitally recorded content (e.g., music and video) via popular Internet services
like Napster.
28 Brief for Petitioners at *5-6, Eldred v. Ashcroft (No. 01-618), 2002 WL
1041928.
29 Id. at *6.
30 Cave, supra note 1, at *1.
31 Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999). The original suit named
Attorney General Janet Reno as a defendant in her official capacity representing the
United States. After appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the case was renamed to reflect the
current Attorney General, John Ashcroft.
32 Brief for Petitioners at *3-5, Eldred v. Ashcroft (No. 01-618), 2002 WL
1041928.
33 Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1-2.
34 Id. at 1-2 n.2 (citing No Electronic Theft Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-147, 111
Stat. 2678, amending 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)). Violations bring potential fines of $500,000
and up to five years imprisonment. Cave, supra note 1, at * 1.
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in the District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality of the
law on its face.35 Each side submitted its own motion for summary
judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the government.36
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to a three-judge panel of the
D.C. Circuit, asserting error under the First Amendment and
Copyright Clause.37 In a split decision, the majority affirmed the
district court's judgment upholding the constitutionality of the
CTEA38 and found that copyrighted speech is "categorically
immune from challenges under the First Amendment."39 The D.C.
Circuit held that the law does not curb the flow of ideas; it merely
limits specific and proprietary forms of expression.40 Judge
Sentelle's dissent challenged legislative authority to incrementally
extend copyright protection time and time again: "Congress can
extend the protection of an existing work ... [repeatedly] and in
effect can [indirectly] accomplish precisely what the majority
admits it cannot do directly."'" He found the absence of "some
definable stopping point"42 contrary to the Supreme Court's
federalism principles as espoused in Lopez."
There was also disagreement among the circuit judges about
whether or not the Constitution's language was simply hortatory
or whether the copyright power required statutes actually "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'  The D.C.
Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc,45 so the Supreme Court
35 Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's Power to Promote the Progress of Science:
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1, 7 (2002) (citing Plaintiffs' Complaint,
Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d. 1 (D.D.C. 1999)).
36 1d. at 7; see also Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
37 See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text (discussing the basic claims).
38 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 375 (paraphrasing United Video, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n,
890 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
40 See id.
41 Id. at 382.
42 Id.
43 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez limited Congress's
Commerce Clause power by invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The
Court held that although the Constitution gave Congress the authority to regulate
commerce, such power remained subject to some outer limits. See id. at 551, 556-57.
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45 255 F.3d 849 (2001).
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granted certiorari to resolve the role of the First Amendment and
the limited times boundary on Congress's copyright authority.46
To understand the Court's decision, it is first necessary to examine
the history of copyright law preceding the CTEA and Eldred.
III. Background Law
47
The CTEA is the latest federal statute to extend copyright
protection, but it is hardly the first to do so. Congress first
exercised its copyright power in 1790.48 The 1790 Act granted a
term providing protection for fourteen years from the date of
publication, which was renewable for an additional fourteen years
if the author survived the initial period and actively sought
renewal.49  Like many laws of the early republic, the 1790 Act
largely reflected the English practice of the time, which was
governed by the Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710.5 o
In 1831, Congress lengthened the primary grant to twenty-
eight years and maintained the secondary renewal at fourteen
years.5" Another extension in 1909 kept the primary period of
twenty-eight years and prolonged the renewal to a matching
46 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
47 Due to its limited scope, this note will review only the relevant history of the
various copyright acts and the international laws and treaties that have influenced
domestic copyright law. The background law and First Amendment claims in Eldred,
having little to no international aspects, are better reserved for a more generalized
discussion of the case.
48 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) [hereinafter 1790 Act].
49 Id.
50 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 778 n.5 (2003) (citing 8 Ann., c. 19).
Interestingly, the Statute of Anne appears to be more than simply a basis for the first
copyright act; it is an apparent ancestor of the Copyright Clause itself. It was entitled
"An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by... Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers." Id. (referencing Goldsmiths'-Kress Library of Economic
Literature, Segment 1: Printed Books Through 1800, Microfilm No. 7300 (reel 460)).
This language is very similar in form and substance to the clause granting Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Both seem on their face to emphasize the
advancement of knowledge as a foundational justification for granting proprietary
protection to writings.
51 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831) [hereinafter 1831
Act].
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twenty-eight years.52 Thus, the 1790, 1831, and 1909 Acts
permitted copyrights for, at most, twenty-eight, forty-two, and
fifty-six years respectively. Both the 1831 and 1909 Acts
conferred copyright protection to existing and future works, as
does the CTEA.53 The 1831 Act's extension was slightly different,
though, as it required all existing works to be within their initial
copyright term when the extension was enacted in order to
qualify.54 By comparison, the 1909 Act allowed existing works to
qualify for an additional extension even if they were in the twenty-
eight year renewal period.55
Congress undertook a major revision of copyright law in
1976,56 significantly departing from the existing structure and
statutory scheme in a number of important ways. The 1976 Act
established rights based on the nature of the author, with differing
standards for named authors and anonymous works or those made
for hire.57 If an author was an identified natural person, the work
was protected until fifty years after the author's death.58 Works
authored by more than one person were protected fifty years from
the death of the last surviving author, so long as the writing was
not made for hire.59 "In the case of an anonymous work, a
pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright
endures for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its first
publication, or a term of one hundred years from the year of its
creation, whichever expires first., 6' Thus, if a named author were
to write and publish a work early in life, the 1976 Act could easily
provide legal protection a full century longer than the meager
fourteen years offered by the first Copyright Act in 1790.
The CTEA went further than the 1976 Act when it extended
protection for another twenty years. Under the CTEA, copyrights
52 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1080-81 (1909) [hereinafter
1909 Act].
53 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 775 (citing 1831 Act §§ 1, 16; 1909 Act §§ 23-24).
54 Id. (citing 1831 Act §§ 1, 16).
55 Id. (citing 1909 Act § 23-24).
56 See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810).
57 Id. § 302.
58 Id. § 302(a).
59 Id. § 302(b).
60 Id. § 302(c).
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survive for the author's life plus seventy years, and in the case of
"a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95
years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first."'" This
extension represents nearly a ten-fold increase in the duration of
copyright when compared to the terms of the initial grant by the
First Congress.
IV. Analysis and Significance
A. The First Amendment
62
As previously noted, the petitioners in Eldred asserted First
Amendment and Copyright Clause challenges to the CTEA.63 The
Supreme Court unequivocally and perhaps unsurprisingly rejected
the suggestion that there was an unconstitutional impairment of
free speech.64 "We reject petitioners' plea for imposition of
uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards. 65
Though not clearly stated, the Court appeared unanimous in this
respect. Neither Justice Stevens nor Justice Breyer mentioned the
First Amendment holding in his dissent, leading one to believe
there was no disagreement among members of the Court.6 6  This
position is further supported by consensus among members of the
61 CTEA § 302.
62 Although the Court first addresses the copyright issues in Eldred, this paper's
areas of emphasis are better served by first quickly addressing the free speech claims and
reserving the copyright discussion for subpart B.
63 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
64 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 788 (2003).
65 Id.
66 See id. at 790-801 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 801-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating the absence of any First Amendment disagreement). Justice Breyer's
dissent, however, uses First Amendment goals of encouraging expression to animate his
understanding of the Copyright Clause. Id. "The Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment seek related objectives-the creation and dissemination of information.
When working in tandem, these provisions mutually reinforce each other, the first
serving as an 'engine of free expression,' the second assuring that government throws up
no obstacle to its dissemination." Id. at 801-02 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, he
remains silent as to the suggestion of a free speech right to the particular form of
expression, but is instead concerned about the CTEA's broad limits on communication.
Id. at 813. "This statute will cause serious expression-related harm." Id.
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D.C. Circuit panel on the First Amendment issue with the
exception of Judge Sentelle who wrote, "[w]hile I concur with
much of the majority's opinion, insofar as it holds constitutional
the twenty-year or more extension of copyright protection for
existing works, I dissent."67
Justice Ginsburg's opinion reaffirmed the Court's decision in
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,68 which
held that there was a "definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's
expression."69 The Court also emphasized free speech protections
built directly into the Copyright Act:
First, it distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes
only the latter eligible for copyright protection. Specifically, 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) provides: 'In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.'
70
Justice Ginsburg also cited the "fair use" defense, which allows
limited use even of copyrighted forms of expression, as providing
additional speech protection.7'
The Court also observed that particular features of the CTEA
comport with free speech principles:
The CTEA itself supplements these traditional First Amendment
safeguards. First, it allows libraries, archives, and similar
institutions to 'reproduce' and 'distribute, display, or perform in
facsimile or digital form' copies of certain published works
'during the last 20 years of any term of copyright ... for
purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research' if the work is
not already being exploited commercially and further copies are
unavailable at a reasonable price.
7 2
67 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
68 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
69 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 789 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
70 Id. at 788-89.
71 Id. at 789.
72 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)).
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While it is significant that the CTEA supplements traditional
First Amendment safeguards, one must also note that this
exemption only applies if the work is within the "last 20 years of
any term of copyright" and if "further copies are unavailable at a
reasonable price. 73  This understanding is somewhat circular,
since it assumes the CTEA twenty-year extension of copyright
protection is itself constitutionally permissible. Standing alone,
this reliance on the CTEA exceptions might undermine the First
Amendment determination, but when considered as only one part
of the reasoning, it remains fairly evident that the majority's
conclusion is sound. This finding is reinforced only by the
observation that "the case petitioners principally rely upon for
their First Amendment argument, Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc., v. FCC,74 bears little on copyright."75 That case, the Court
ruled, was distinguishable as compelling unwanted speech through
mandatory broadcasting requirements.7 6  Accordingly, very
different speech interests are involved in copyright. "The First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make--or decline to
make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's speeches."" With the First
Amendment claim rather conclusively resolved, Eldred's
copyright issues come to the forefront and offer the most fertile
ground for purposes of this discussion.
B. The Copyright Clause
In what might come as somewhat of a surprise, there is a
dearth of cases that address the constitutional boundaries of the
Copyright Clause. "There is no well-developed body of
constitutional law that defines Congress's power to promote the
progress of science. There are no clearly defined criteria for what
constitutes a limited time."78 The Court implicitly acknowledges a
vacant copyright case history and featureless precedential
landscape when it construes copyright power exclusively through
73 17 U.S.C. § 108(h).
74 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
75 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 789 (citations omitted).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Solum, supra note 35, at 81.
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its discussion of patent cases.79 If nothing else, the sudden
importance of congressional power to make laws affecting the
rights and protections for intellectual property reflects the modem
value of these intangible knowledge-based assets in an
increasingly information intensive world economy.
1. Persistent Extensions as Limited Times
As previously discussed, Congress has repeatedly extended
the protections of the Copyright Act by passing legislation in
1831, 1909, 1976, and again in 1998 via the CTEA. After the
Court considered the petitioners' challenge to the CTEA, its
answer was plain: "the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to
prescribe 'limited Times' for copyright protection and to secure
the same level and duration of protection for all copyright holders,
present and future."8  The principal question remained; what
represents a "limited time"?
Justice Ginsburg began her analysis with the observation that
"CTEA's baseline term of life plus 70 years, petitioners concede,
qualifies as a 'limited Tim[e]' as applied to future copyrights."''8
Eldred and his fellow plaintiffs contended, however, that even if a
twenty year extension "is literally a 'limited Tim[e],' permitting
Congress to extend existing copyrights allows it to evade the
'limited Times' constraint by creating effectively perpetual
copyrights through repeated extensions. ' ' 81 Justice Ginsburg
refuted this argument by echoing the judgment of the D.C. Circuit
panel that "a regime of perpetual copyrights 'clearly is not the
situation before us. ,''3  Justice Ginsburg also found that
"petitioners fail to show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally
significant threshold with respect to 'limited Times' that the 1831,
1909, and 1976 Acts did not., 84 This reasoning suggests that so
79 See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 779. To be sure, the analysis is effectively the same
since "the Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights also authorizes patents."
Id. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the Court has had so few occasions to consider the
meaning of limited Times.
80 Id. at 778.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 783.
83 Id. (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
84 Id.
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long as Congress mirrors its tactics in passing prior copyright acts
and is able to articulate a rational reason, it is essentially
unfettered in its ability to extend protection.
It is somewhat troubling that previous copyright extensions are
actually used to justify the latest one, representing a type of
inverted logic. Here, the majority seems to have said that
"Congress has done this before, so it must be constitutional." 5
The Court should have made a more rigorous analysis, one that the
petitioners and dissenters all advocated. The dissents suggest that
precisely because Congress has done this before, the Court should
be somewhat more skeptical of the legislation - not less.86 Again,
Judge Sentelle's critique is illuminating: "The Congress that can
extend the protection of an existing work from 100 years to 120
years, can extend that protection from 120 years to 140; and from
140 to 200; and from 200 to 300; and in effect can accomplish
precisely what the majority admits it cannot do directly."87 The
fact that the Court has approved of congressional action to
incrementally extend copyrights only serves to encourage present
or future surreptitious attempts by Congress to legislate beyond
the scope of its authority. This portion of the decision indirectly
promotes subterfuge of federalism principles and enhances the
likelihood of precisely the type of situation our system of
separation of powers is intended to prevent.
Beyond using prior legislative action to buttress current law,
the majority fails to offer much discernible insight into what could
be a "constitutionally significant threshold with respect to 'limited
Times."' 88 So long as Congress is sophisticated enough to pass
copyright laws that are incremental and not blatantly indefinite, it
seems the Court will remain unwilling to support a facial
constitutional challenge.89 Absent any contrary indication in
85 Cf ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15-16 (1962). Justice
Holmes stated:
[It is] revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past. Id.
86 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
87 Id.
88 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 783.
89 See id. at 782-84 (recognizing an explicitly perpetual copyright is not within the
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Eldred, one can only assume that if there is a breach of the
constitutional threshold embedded in the Copyright Clause, the
Court will know it when it sees it.9" Indeed, it seems that "limited
Times" will merely require copyright statutes to be "'confine[d]
within certain bounds,' 'restrain[ed],' or 'circumscribed"' as
understood now, and as the term was known at the time of the
framing. 9'
In addition to being definitionally 'limited,' the Court's
decision also declares that nothing "warrants construction of the
CTEA's 20-year term extension as a congressional attempt to
evade or override the 'limited Times' constraint., 92 The opinion
considered the legislative history and intent of the CTEA and vests
great trust in the apparent self-restraint possessed by Congress:
The House and Senate Reports accompanying the CTEA reflect
no purpose to make copyright a forever thing. Notably, the
Senate Report expressly acknowledged that the Constitution
'clearly precludes Congress from granting unlimited protection
for copyrighted works,' and disclaimed any intent to contravene
that prohibition. Members of Congress instrumental in the
CTEA's passage spoke to similar effect.93
Thus, the implication from Eldred is that Congress can enact any
copyright or patent legislation it chooses so long as it enunciates a
term of years or comparably definable period.94 Furthermore,
absent the clearest expression of an impermissible congressional
intent to create a perpetual copyright, Congress can act as it
pleases.
limited Times requirement while distinguishing the CTEA).
90 See Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Here Justice Stewart's concurrence recognized the futility of an attempt to
judicially describe sexually explicit speech that may be prescribed under the First
Amendment when he famously quipped, "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that." Id.
91 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 778 (quoting authoritative dictionaries, citations omitted)
(alterations by the Court).
92 Id. at 783.
93 Id. at 783 n.16 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-315, at 11 (1996)) (internal citations
omitted).
94 Id. at 772-84.
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2. Retroactive Extensions as Limited Times
While there were few cases that squarely tackled what
constituted a limited time,95 the majority was able to marshal some
meaningful precedent to answer the claim that retroactive
copyright extensions were appropriate. Justice Ginsburg invoked
past decisions from Justices Story and John Marshall suggesting
there has never been "any doubt of the constitutional authority of
Congress to enact a 14-year patent extension that 'operates
retrospectively."'96 The same basic premise of what connotes a
limited time for future copyrights is used in permitting
retrospective extensions. Properly "understood, a time span
appropriately 'limited' as applied to future copyrights does not
automatically cease to be 'limited' when applied to existing
copyrights."97
The majority also makes the simple assertion that
"Congress'[s] unbroken practice since the founding generation
thus overwhelms petitioners' argument that the CTEA's extension
of existing copyrights" violates the Constitution.98 This claim,
however, is subject to the same questions previously raised in this
note99 : it is somewhat unsatisfactory merely to invoke history as
the principle defense of what may have been a constitutionally
suspect practice even at the time of the founding. The Court
answers such a critique by citing precedent. "Such consistent
congressional practice is entitled to 'very great weight, and when
it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been
disputed during a period of [over two] centur[ies], it is almost
conclusive."" 00  But to its credit, the majority shored up its
position by recounting the policy judgment animating the
95 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
96 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 779 (quoting Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650
(C.C. Mass. 1839) (no. 1,518) (Story, J.)).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 785-86. For a thorough analysis of the views of the Founders, see L. Ray
Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View
of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article L Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909 (2003).
99 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying discussion.
100 Eldred, 123. S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
11l U.S. 53, 57 (1884)) (alterations by Justice Ginsburg).
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retroactive application of copyrights since the very first act.''
Equity demands that the law not put yesterday's author in a worse
position than today's author, who can claim a new copyright the
day after a new act takes effect.0 2 This justification has persisted
since 1790, when Congress implemented the policy "that the
author of yesterday's work should not get a lesser reward than the
author of tomorrow's work just because Congress passed a statute
lengthening the term today."'0 3
The decision in Eldred dismissed other claims made by
petitioners, "all premised on the proposition that Congress may not
extend an existing copyright absent new consideration from the
author."'" One argument claimed the CTEA did not sufficiently
require originality.0 5 The Court held the originality it spoke of in
Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.° 6 requires
a "creative spark"'0 7 for a work "to be eligible for copyright
protection at all."'0 8 Feist in no way defined what was a limited
time "for which a work may be protected, and the originality
requirement has no bearing on that prescription."'0 9
The second set of arguments were closely related to each
other."0 Taken together, the petitioners claimed that the language
of the Copyright Clause requires acts of Congress to actually
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"'' . and creates a
quid pro quo whereby authors receive the benefit of an "exclusive
Right"' 2 to their writings in exchange for contributing original
101 Id. at 780-81.
102 id. (citing Representative Huntington, 7 CONG. DEB. 424 (1831)).
103 Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is
Too Long? 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 694 (2002) (panel discussion comments
of Professor Arthur Miller) (cited favorably in Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 780-81) [hereinafter
Cardozo Symposium].
104 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 784.
105 Id.
106 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
107 Id. at 346.
108 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 784.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 786.
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
112 Id.
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expression to the public discourse and domain. 1 3 The majority
was unwilling to declare the "preambular language" of the
Copyright Clause as anything more than hortatory.' 4 Instead, the
majority affirmed that the preamble states only a primary objective
and not a constitutional command." 5  "The 'constitutional
command,' we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it
enacts copyright laws at all, create a 'system' to promote the
progress of science and useful arts. 1 6  The majority's opinion
suggests that every legislative action need not advance scientific
or artistic aims individually, so long as the overarching system of
intellectual property protection does so.
The Court's analysis and the preceding discussion involved
only the facial, and to some extent the definitional, examination as
to what power the Constitution grants Congress concerning
copyrights. The standard of review can only be described as de
minimis. 1 " The opinion confirmed that this examination is merely
a threshold analysis when it concluded, "[g]uided by text, history,
and precedent, we cannot agree with petitioners' submission that
extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically
beyond Congress'[s] authority under the Copyright Clause."'"18
With the 'outer limits' "" thus prescribed, the Court then addressed
whether the CTEA is a "rational exercise of the legislative
authority conferred by the Copyright Clause."'2 °
3. Rational Basis Analysis
The majority examined the policy interests allegedly advanced
by the CTEA and found that Congress's legislative decisions
easily satisfied minimum rationality.'2 ' The justices cited two
prominent and legitimate justifications for the CTEA. The first
113 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 786.
114 See id. at 784.
115 Id. at 784-85.
116 Id. at 785 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966)).
117 See supra discussion of subsection 2 and accompanying notes 92-116.
118 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 781 (emphasis added).
119 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995); see also supra note 43.
120 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 781.
121 Id. at 782 ("In sum, we find that the CTEA is a rational enactment[.]").
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was the congressional interest in bringing the CTEA into parity
with prevailing European standards. 22  The second was that
Congress was merely responding to evolving technological and
demographic realities. 1
23
The majority of the Eldred Court ruled, "a key factor in the
CTEA's passage was a 1993 European Union (EU) directive
instructing EU members to establish a copyright term of life plus
70 years." 124  The Court agreed with the respondents' view that
Congress was trying to assure that domestic authors would receive
copyright privileges comparable to those of European authors and
creators. 25 The Court drew attention to the ample documentation
and legislative findings to support this conclusion. 126  Such
evidence revealed that the Register of Copyrights had testified
before a congressional subcommittee, saying "[t]he reason why
you're going to life-plus-70 today is because Europe has gone that
way.'
127
The twenty-year extension granted under the CTEA was not
the first of its kind to mirror a prevailing international copyright
standard. The 1976 Act did precisely the same thing.'28 The 1976
Act "aligned United States copyright terms with the then-dominant
international standard adopted under the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.' 29  The CTEA, the
Court believed, was merely the latest adjustment in an ever-
evolving system of international copyright protection, and it was
fully within Congress's discretion to judge the standard as
requiring the conformity of American law. 3°
122 Id. at 781-82.
123 Id. at 782 n.14.
124 Id. at 781 (citing EU Council Directive 93/98, p. 4).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 781-82.
127 id. at 781-82 n.l (quoting Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film
Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 230 (1995)).
128 Id. at 775-76.
129 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 135 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659).
130 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 782-83 ("[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess
congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order .... ").
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The Berne Convention was not a. new feature of international
law, and there is a long history of international copyright
regulations. The original Convention in 1886131 was the result of a
series of negotiations begun in Brussels nearly thirty years
earlier. 3 2  The majority in Eldred embraced CTEA's
congressional acceptance of copyright parity with European
partners - a choice the legislature had declined to make as far back
as 1837.133 A failed bill from that year "disclosed a remarkably
internationalist perspective on the Copyright Clause" among some
early law makers, but American publishers were nonetheless able
to forestall meaningful harmonization with foreign standards until
the amendments of the 1976 Act.134 The United States did not
become a part of the Berne Convention until 1998 with the
passage of the CTEA, although the 1976 Act made domestic
standards roughly equivalent to those required by treaty
adherents.'35
Beyond the strong international evidence, the Eldred Court
found that Congress had sufficient reason to pass the CTEA based
on increased human longevity and evolving media. 136  The
decision cited statements in the record by many well-known
lawmakers corroborating demographic shifts and significant
changes in technology while crediting Congress for "fashion[ing]
the new rules that technology made necessary."' 37 The majority
also made somewhat unenthusiastic acknowledgements that
copyright protection can encourage investment in the restoration
of aging works. 138  Though sufficient to support a rational
131 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971).
132 Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism? 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 41 (2002).
133 Id. at 39-42.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 42. The period from 1976 to 1998 allowed American authors to indirectly
gain copyright protection by jointly publishing in the United States and Canada, which
did adhere to the Convention. Id. This practice "ensured [that] many of the benefits of
the Convention accrued to American copyright industries... [with] few of its burdens."
Id.
136 Eldredv. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 782 n.14 (2003).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 782-83.
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relationship affirmation by the Court, this justification is
somewhat dubious when considering the petitioners' suggestion
that any incentive for an author to create new material surely
cannot survive for decades beyond one's death. 3 9
Justice Breyer's dissent offered a more robust standard than
mere rationality. He would have found that "the statute lacks the
constitutionally necessary rational support if (1) the significant
benefits that it bestows are private, not public; (2) it threatens
seriously to undermine the expressive values that the Copyright
Clause embodies; and (3) it cannot find justification in any
significant Clause-related objective."' 4 °  Though he declined to
refer to this standard as a measure of heightened scrutiny, 141 it is
difficult to perceive Justice Breyer's criteria as being anything but
substantially more demanding than the familiar rational basis test.
This position is defensible, because "it is necessary only to
recognize that this statute involves not pure economic regulation,
but regulation of expression, and what may count as rational
where economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational
where we focus on expression," as Justice Breyer asserts.1 42 While
his approach is a novel one, he remains alone in his dissent on
these expression-related grounds. As previously observed, there is
virtually universal agreement that no First Amendment right to
expression in a particular proprietary form exists. Justice Breyer's
test, "would look harder than does the majority at the statute's
rationality-though less hard than precedent might justify.' 43
139 Id. at 807. Justice Breyer wondered in his dissent, "[how will extension help
today's Noah Webster create new works 50 years after his death?" Id.
140 Id. at 802.
141 Id. at 781. The majority finds the proposed test to be a heightened form of
judicial scrutiny; "Justice Breyer's stringent version of rationality is unknown to our
literary property jurisprudence." Id. at 781 n.10.
142 Id. at 802.
143 Id. The Constitution grants an affirmative power when it declares that Congress
shall have the power to promote progress by securing to authors the exclusive use of
their writings. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The precedent to which Justice Breyer
refers is a line of Equal Protection cases that do not fit well into the affirmative grant of
the Copyright Clause. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-
50 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982); Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534-38 (1973). By comparison, the Equal Protection clause creates negative
rights and is restrictive of government power. "No state shall.., deprive any
person .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A more appropriate analogue is the
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This novel test falls in an awkward no-man's land, artificially
trying to extend greater scrutiny on rational basis grounds.'44 As
discussed previously, a more frontal assault on the categorical
power of Congress to wield its copyright power would be easier to
support.1
45
Justice Stevens did not appear to be disturbed by the rational
basis approved by the majority. Rather, his dissent was more in
keeping with Judge Sentelle's from the D.C. Circuit. 46 He found
the majority conclusion based "on the mistaken premise that this
Court has virtually no role in reviewing congressional grants of
monopoly privileges to authors, inventors, and their
successors . . . . 147 He was most troubled by the foundational
analysis of what constituted a limited time, and believed that
"insofar as the ... [CTEA] purported to extend [existing]
copyrights," it is invalid. 148 Justice Stevens's dissent is simply an
honest matter of disagreement with the members of the majority
on the limited times interpretation, but he raises a compelling
argument in his conclusion:
Fairly read, the Court has stated that Congress'[s] actions under
the Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and purposes,
judicially unreviewable. That result cannot be squared with the
basic tenets of our constitutional structure. It is not hyperbole to
recall the trenchant words of Chief Justice John Marshall: 'It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is., 149
This invocation reveals the majority's most glaring defect in that
the Court has essentially refused to meaningfully define or
Commerce Clause: "The Congress shall have Power to... regulate Commerce ."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The adaptation of these Equal Protection cases severely
undermines the credibility that precedent would justify an even more demanding view
than the one he is suggesting. Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as with other
enumerated federal powers, requires judicial restraint and deference to the legislature.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
144 See generally Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 790, 802.
145 See generally discussion supra Part IV.B §§ 1-2.
146 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
147 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 790.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 801 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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interpret the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. 150
V. Conclusion
This note has thus far described how the Court framed the
discussion of the various issues in Eldred and how it analyzed the
case within that framework. The First Amendment challenge
raised in the case was summarily rejected by effectively
unanimous judgments from the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court. "5' The Eldred opinion rightly cited the substantially
different interests and balance between free-speech and laws that
protect particular forms of expression. 152 It is significant that the
various copyright acts have consistently sought to protect free
expression and fair use of protected material.'53 From the long
interplay between these two interests, it cannot be considered
novel or surprising that the Court followed its precedent from
Harper & Row 54 and declined to invoke the First Amendment to
invalidate the CTEA.'55 There are some compelling underlying
principles worth considering, and Justice Breyer's dissent captures
some of them in his emphasis on indirect inhibitions on
expression.'56 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has made an even
150 See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner:
Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112
YALE L.J. 2331, 2332-34 (2003). Professors Schwartz and Treanor contemporaneously
arrived at a similar conclusion, describing how the Court "did not offer a satisfactory...
conception of the Copyright Clause and how the courts should construe it." Id. Their
article provides an excellent analysis of conceptual underpinnings and the level of review
applied by the Court. They offer a coherent argument for deferential judicial review and
support it with "a new paradigm for understanding the Copyright Clause." Id. For a
differing yet similarly compelling discussion of copyright theory, see Jon M. Garon,
Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278 (2003). These and other emerging scholarly contributions
will add value and insight to the vibrant debate of where the law should develop from
here.
151 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
152 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 789 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
153 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
154 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
155 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
156 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 777. "Copyright.... does not impermissibly restrict free
speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression;
it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for
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more persuasive argument, 157 echoing, in part, the quid pro quo
concepts of the petitioners, but in the end the majority has found a
comfortable balance in the gaps between these occasionally
antagonistic concepts.
158
As to copyright principles, Eldred does not fully confront the
repeated extension of copyright as a violation of the limited times
mandate. The Court suggests there are only two possible ways for
the Congress to breach the Constitution: first, a law must not be
overtly perpetual, but this amounts to requiring nothing more than
a stated term of years.'59 Absent lawmaking buffoonery, which
some may contend is par for the course, Congress can pass a
copyright protection of any length if it can place it in some
definable limit. 6 ' The second pitfall can only come by way of
similar malfeasance: Congress must not admit in the record or
legislative history that it aims to create a copyright with a defacto
perpetual duration.16' Barefaced improper congressional intent is
not likely to be forthcoming and will only encourage pretextual
justifications intended to obscure otherwise improper aims. These
negligible requirements are meaningless and offer no greater
constitutionally significant threshold than before the case was
heard. 162 The Court's holding has drawn the brightest of lines, but
those lines have no practical relevance and do not provide the
necessary boundaries to genuinely frame the copyright
'fair use' even of the expression itself." Id. (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375-76
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
157 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and
Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 83 (2002) (arguing that copyright is tolerated because it encourages speech, but
that extending protection after the initial expression fails to meet the same function and
therefore unduly inhibits protected communication).
158 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 777-78.
159 See id. at 782-84 (declaring the CTEA's protection for a stated term of years is a
limited time).
160 Id.
161 See id. at 781-82 (stating that Congress had proper and rational justifications for
the CTEA).
162 Id. at 782-84. The interpretation that limited Times prohibits only facially
perpetual copyright was widely conceded. Id. "The CTEA's baseline term of life plus
70 years, petitioners concede, qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future
copyrights." Id. at 778.
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landscape. '63
Similar criticisms are available when considering the
majority's treatment of retroactive copyright extensions."64 An
unbroken historical practice alone does not make an act any more
or less constitutional.'65 Any justification that retroactivity was
consistent with the intent of the Founders is offset by the
recognition that the copyright system they enacted in 1790 has
now been exceeded roughly by a factor of ten.'66 Going from
fourteen years to a copyright term that could span 140 years and
suggesting that the same ideas apply, strains the boundaries of
credibility.
The policies that supported early nineteenth-century
retroactive extensions are, by comparison, much more robust and
convincing. 6 7  It is a very reasonable policy judgment for
legislators to consider parity among past and present authors and
creators an important goal. This justification helps to salvage the
majority's infirm historical justification.'68 Petitioners' contention
that the CTEA does not require originality is as misplaced as the
historical practice premise, and the Court correctly treats it as such
by dismissing the originality claim out of hand. 6 9
Eldred and his fellow plaintiffs' innovative construction of the
language of the Copyright Clause would impose a heavy burden
on laws to prove that each statute actually "promote[s] the
progress of science and useful arts."'170  A more balanced
163 Id.
164 Id. at 785.
165 Id. at 785. "Such consistent congressional practice is entitled to 'very great
weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been
disputed during a period of [over two] centur[ies], it is almost conclusive."' Id. (quoting
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 57, 59 (1883)). This type of
reasoning has been used to justify some of our nation's most scurrilous practices. It is as
if saying slavery was right and constitutional merely because things have always been
that way.
166 See 1790 Act.
167 Id.
168 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
169 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 784. "Petitioners' 'originality' argument draws on
[Feist] .... [That] decision did not construe the 'limited Times' for which a work may
be protected, and the originality requirement has no bearing on that prescription." Id.
170 Id. at 784-85 (declining to construe the preamble of the Copyright Clause as a
controlling limit on power).
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understanding, as the Court properly ruled, requires merely that
Congress create a copyright system to advance this
constitutionally articulated interest. 7' Mandating that each
individual statute or particular application of law must meet this
standard would be cumbersome and ill-suited to the judicial
process. The preambular language is better understood as
hortatory, placing a burden of constitutional proportion merely on
the broader intellectual property protection apparatus.
Like the issue of creating parity for past authors, there is room
for sensible disagreement on the question of whether the
Copyright Clause presumes a quidpro quo.172 It is perfectly fair to
suggest that copyright protection inherently supposes an exchange
based on reciprocal benefits and sacrifices between a private
author and the public domain.'73 This concept recognizes the costs
and benefits to both creators and the public.'74 Striking such a
delicate balance calls for difficult judgments as to where those
interests intersect, where they begin to overlap, or when they start
to overwhelm each other.' Parity, the public/private balance, and
how to achieve the fundamental aims of the copyright clause
require the type of judgments and balancing that are well-suited to
legislators - especially when those lawmakers are democratically
accountable to an electorate.
One factor that helps tip the scale in favor of deference toward
legislative policy making remains that the Copyright Clause is an
enumerated and affirmative grant of power to the first branch.
17 6
Were the Clause a restrictive decree reserving power elsewhere
rather than a permissive allocation, the analysis would call for
closer judicial inquiry. For example, there is merit in the
suggestion that little incentive remains to author a new writing
merely from the existence of a prior writing. While it is true that
an author might use resources from the first copyright to support
his continued labor, the mere fact of copyright protection for
volume one of a book does not inherently encourage dedication to
171 Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1965)).
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the drafts of volume two. It is especially difficult to suggest that
one's heirs are driven to create new work merely because a prior
work is copyrighted.'77 Instead, it is easy to recognize the
financial benefit of extending valuable copyright, but there
remains nothing to suggest those resources will go toward new
expression or inventions that enhance public discourse or science
and the useful arts.' 78 If the Copyright Clause was a restriction
against certain copyright power comparable to the prohibition
against ex post facto laws,'79 the balance might tilt against the
constitutionality of the CTEA. 18 ° Nevertheless, as a permissive
grant of power to the Congress, the Court properly exercises
deference once navigating within the outer bounds of the
Copyright Clause's constitutionality. 8'
One issue bubbling beneath the surface in Eldred is generally
absent from the reserved discussion of the justices - political
influence. There is little reason to doubt the observation shared by
many popular and expert political observers alike;'82 the CTEA is
a fine example of Congress doing the bidding of some of the
world's most powerful and politically active media
conglomerates.183  The legislative history, Justice Breyer
recounted, "refers frequently to the financial assistance the statute
will bring the entertainment industry," but it does little to protect
any interests of having works in the public domain.'84 "I cannot
find any constitutionally legitimate, copyright-related way in
which the statute will benefit the public. Indeed, in respect to
177 Id. at 807 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("How will extension help today's Noah Webster
create new works 50 years after his death?").
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
180 See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 786.
181 Id. at 777 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984)).
182 See, e.g., supra notes 1-2.
183 Sprigman, supra note 2.
Disney and its friends - a group of Hollywood studios, music labels, and PACs
representing content owners - told Congress that they wanted an extension bill passed.
Prompted perhaps by the Disney group's lavish donations of campaign cash - more than
$6.3 million in 1997-98... Congress passed and President Clinton signed the [CTEA].
Id.
184 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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existing works, the serious public harm and the virtually
nonexistent public benefit could not be more clear."' 85
The fact that there is so much benefit for such a narrow class
of special interests and so little regard for the benefits of the public
domain suggests the Court may later regret not giving the limited
times provision more teeth. The majority opinion endorsed a
minimalist reading of the requirements of the Copyright Clause
that (1) does little to illuminate the meaning of what qualifies as a
limited time and (2) fails to restrain potential abuse or subterfuge
by Congress. At some future point the Court is likely to find its
precedent too relaxed to provide any boundaries to prevent
untoward congressional action. One can fairly argue that in not
striking down the CTEA the Court failed to put the brakes on a
legislature already careening out of control.
The circumstances after Eldred are strikingly reminiscent of
the post-World War II period in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. "' During the sixty years before Lopez, 8 7 the
judiciary unquestioningly deferred to congressional action
authorized by the Constitution's grant of commerce power. 88
When Congress filled the vacuum with ever-expanding legislation
under the auspices of its commerce authority, the Court eventually
found it necessary to reclaim constitutional limits to a similarly
enumerated power in Lopez and later in Morrison.'89 It seems that
the Eldred decision sets in motion a similar dynamic that may or
may not end in the Court revisiting its articulation of the basic
requirements of the Copyright Clause.
Rather than acting as the arbiter of what the law is, the Court
has declined to assume a role of any importance in determining the
bounds of American intellectual property law. The justices have
chosen not to utilize their role as a national court to demarcate
how our country's limited times provision may impair copyright
law when compared in the international arena to bodies like the
185 Id. at 813 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 194
(1997).
187 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
188 Id. at 555-57.
189 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act on federalism grounds).
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European Union, which are not similarly restricted.' 9°
There are undoubtedly good rational bases for the twenty year
extension granted by the CTEA. It is apparent from even a
cursory look at both American and foreign legal history that there
has been a progressive internationalization of intellectual property
laws.' 91 Even when the United States declined to be a direct party
to international standards like the Berne Convention for over a
century, it was still acting and legislating with international
impacts in mind.192 Professor Arthur Miller made the point well:
"Congress did not give a fig about Europe .... Congress was
trying to create a regime that would make it easier for Americans
to market in Europe, to disseminate in Europe, and to make sure
American authors would receive [the same] protection in
Europe .. ..""' Even if not concerned with the interests of
Europe, the increasing cross-border implications and occasional
interdependence brought by a global economy is essentially what
has driven U.S. copyright policy since the passage of the 1976
Act.' 94 The same international pressures existed for the CTEA,
and they have only been enhanced by the technological difficulties
of protecting digital media that are infinitely fluid and
reproducible. Taken as a whole, these factors support a judicially
restrained approach to invalidating congressional enactments - but
the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft sets the
constitutional bar too low. Because of this, the judiciary will
probably be forced to revisit questions on the scope of the
Copyright Clause. Since Eldred does not solve the riddle, the
Court will have to resolve whether legislative action making
copyright effectively perpetual comports with "limited Times."
We shall see.
SHILOH DAUM
190 See generally Chicago Symposium, supra note 21, at 991.
191 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual
Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993 (2002) (discussing the history, development,
and current state of international norms).
192 Cardozo Symposium, supra note 103, at 706.
193 Id.
194 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 781-82 (2003) (recounting the CTEA's
international influences as demonstrated by the legislative history).
[Vol. 29
